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ABSTRACT
While historically, economists have been primarily occupied with
analyzing the behaviour of the markets, electronic trading gave rise
to a new class of unprecedented problems associated with market
fairness, transparency andmanipulation. These problems stem from
technical shortcomings that are not accounted for in the simple
conceptual models used for theoretical market analysis. They, thus,
call for more pragmatic market design methodologies that consider
the various infrastructure complexities and their potential impact
on the market procedures.
First, we formally define temporal fairness and then explain why
it is very difficult for order-matching policies to ensure it in con-
tinuous markets. Subsequently, we introduce a list of system re-
quirements and evaluate existing “fair” market designs in various
practical and adversarial scenarios. We conclude that they fail to re-
tain their properties in the presence of infrastructure inefficiencies
and sophisticated technical manipulation attacks. Based on these
findings, we then introduce Libra, a “fair” policy that is resilient to
gaming and tolerant of technical complications. Our security anal-
ysis shows that it is significantly more robust than existing designs,
while Libra’s deployment (in a live foreign currency exchange) val-
idated both its considerably low impact on the operation of the
market and its ability to reduce speed-based predatory trading.
1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction of electronic markets enabled equity, forex and
cryptocurrency exchanges around the world to accommodate the
trading of various assets worth trillions of dollars between mil-
lions of investors. However, this rapid growth gave also rise to
concerns about the operational fairness, transparency and informa-
tion symmetry of exchanges. One of the major points of friction
have been the order matching policies used by the exchanges and
the importance of “speed”.
Themajority of the existing electronicmarkets rely on a continuous-
auction model that matches incoming buy and sell orders in a “first
come, first served” (FCFS) manner [13]. Thus, in financial markets—
and indeed in many other forms of markets [11]—there is a clear
advantage in being “fast”. For example, if the quantity of the traded
resource is scarce, a participant will need to be fast enough to ex-
press their interest before the other investors. Understandably, a
slow participant will have a very low chance of being allocated that
specific resource. “Fast” traders in stock exchanges have a reaction
time in the order of a microseconds or perhaps even nanoseconds,
while they employ increasingly sophisticated optimization tech-
niques (both in hardware and in software) to achieve marginal
improvements [38, 39, 73, 83].
Disclaimer: Views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of Refinitiv and
do not constitute legal or investment advice.
This phenomenon has been studied extensively and several re-
searchers argue that the existing FCFS market designs incentivize
a socially-wasteful technological “arms race” in pursuit of speed
among competing participants [13, 25, 33, 52, 82]. More importantly,
speed advantages are not always the result of smaller reaction
times but can be obtained through technical manipulation tech-
niques that exploit flaws, details or inefficiencies in the exchange’s
infrastructure [18, 18, 43, 54, 76]. For example, the Securities and
Exchanges Board of India recently documented several incidents
where traders colluded with exchange insiders to unfairly outrace
other participants. The insiders assisted them in receiving faster
market updates and order execution by detailing them on the traffic
loads of the exchange’s servers and by allowing them to connect to
faster/less crowded servers intended for contingency. Additionally,
the same traders sought to further increase the information dissem-
ination latency for other market participants (and thus their reac-
tion time) by actively congesting the servers they were using [75].
Besides malicious attempts, network congestion, unevenly busy
routers/gateways and malfunctioning equipment can all contribute
to uneven delays that affect differently each market participant. In
fact, there are many examples in the literature and mainstream me-
dia where venues have been fined for allowing slower participants
to “overtake” faster ones (e.g., [60, 67, 75]).
The problem originates from the gap between economic theory
and the unavoidable complexities that emerge when theoretically
“fair” market models (e.g., FCFS matching) are implemented. While
this issue may seem easy to address, the complex and distributed
architecture of modern exchanges makes it very hard for operators
to keep track of all the potential sources of delays and monitor how
they may affect each participant [51]. Besides monitoring, operators
would also need to maintain their system perfectly symmetrical and
load balanced at all times with microsecond (or even nanosecond,
see [50]) accuracy.
Instead of trying to eliminate all possible sources of uneven
delays, alternative market designs/order-matching policies have
been proposed as solutions [13, 14, 25, 30, 33, 36, 52, 82]. For ex-
ample, Budish et al. [13] introduce a policy that treats time as
a discrete variable (instead of continuous) and replaces continu-
ous auctions with “batches”. This allows for multiple orders to
arrive at the same (discrete) time and aims to alleviate the impor-
tance of (fair or unfair) sub-millisecond differences in submission
times. It is an open area of research as to the totality of effects of
these proposals, with oftentimes contradictory conclusions being
described [4, 10, 11, 15, 16, 20, 22, 26, 40, 64, 79, 80].
In this work, we examine several order-matching policies that
have either been proposed in the literature or are currently de-
ployed in electronic exchanges. Towards this goal, we first intro-
duce a generic definition of temporal fairness that captures fairness
(i.e., the equal treatment of equals [66]) with respect to speed. Addi-
tionally, we outline the required properties that such a policy needs
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to fulfill in order for it to be both fair and practically applicable. Our
analysis suggests that existing policies either fail to remain “fair” in
adversarial settings or introduce delays that are disproportionately
large to the discrepancies they try to address. Furthermore, we
discuss some previously undocumented technical attacks and find
that some of the existing policies are prone to them.
Based on these findings, we then introduce Libra, a carefully
thought-out order-matching policy that seeks to minimize the pro-
cessing delay experienced by market participants while ensuring
fairness even in the presence of several infrastructure inefficien-
cies and sophisticated adversaries. Upon introducing the general
operation principles of our policy, we consider various matching
and manipulation scenarios, and verify that Libra remains fair, fast
and does not substantially disrupt existing features of the market
that do not pertain to speed. Subsequently, we deploy Libra on a
major forex trading venue serving 5000+ users, 900 firms and span-
ning 50 countries.1 Our results suggest that Libra, besides ensuring
temporal fairness, also contributes to the reduction of predatory
practices (e.g., Sniping [41]). Moreover, we verify that even when
deployed with higher latency values, Libra has only a small impact
on existing trading strategies.
Contributions. Overall, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• Introduces a generic definition of temporal fairness that con-
strains all existing viable financial market designs, and cru-
cially one that implementations of those designs can actually
meet.
• Analyzes several market designs and discusses their short-
comings with respect to fairness, resilience to technical ma-
nipulation and market impact.
• Proposes a novel order-matching policy and evaluates its
fairness and effectiveness both analytically and in practice
by deploying it in a live forex exchange.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some fundamental concepts of elec-
tronic markets and discuss the operation of modern exchanges.
2.1 Market Structure
Figure 1 illustrates the different components of an electronic market
and the actors interacting with them. Market participants Pi submit
their orders (e.g., buy stock with symbol ‘AAPL’ at price at most
$100) to their brokers who then route them to the market. Alter-
natively, participants who trade larger volumes can submit orders
directly to the exchange (i.e., direct market access). In both cases,
the exchange receives the incoming orders through its gateways.
Due to the high volume of traffic, exchanges tend to operate several
gateways to balance the load [60]. Those gateways, which are lo-
cated very close to the matching engine, are tasked with handling
incoming orders and forwarding valid ones to it. Once an order is
received by the matching engine, it is placed in the “book” where
a matching algorithm ranks, pairs and fills it with those of other
participants.2 Upon a match, if its entire open quantity is executed,
the order is closed and removed from the book. Otherwise, the
1https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/spot-matching-forwards-matching
2 A more formal treatment of the limit order book is provided by Gould et al. [32].
book’s record is updated to reflect only the remaining (unfilled)
quantity. Finally, the data generation component of the exchange
continuously updates the participants on the state of both the order
book and their pending orders.
Figure 1: Illustration of the components of an electronic fi-
nancial exchange. Participants submit their orders through
their brokers or directly to the exchange’s gateways. In both
cases, the gateways forward the orders to the matching en-
gine that pairs buy with sell orders and updates the order
book with the remaining quantities.
2.2 Order-Matching Policies & Competition
The extent to which speed affects resource allocation in an elec-
tronic financial market depends in large part on the order-matching
policy used. This policy specifies the manner by which a finan-
cial exchange purports to process the order messages it receives
from market participants. The predominant order-matching policy
in electronic financial exchanges worldwide is price-time priority
matching [70]. Under this order-matching policy, the exchange
processes order messages (i.e., allocates resources to messages) im-
mediately, in the temporal order in which those messages were
received (i.e., in a FCFS manner). As a result, ceteris paribus, order
received earlier are more likely to get filled than those received
later. If the quantity of a resource in a market is scarce, a participant
needs to be fast enough to express interest in it before that market
clears. The faster the participant reacts, the higher their allocation
chances are. Conversely, if the participant is too slow in expressing
their interest, they may miss the clearing ‘deadline’ and thus have
no chance of being allocated that resource.
In modern exchanges, this speed-related competition has three
different manifestations depending on the roles of the competing
parties i.e., maker vs. maker, taker vs. taker and maker vs. taker3.
In the first case, makers compete with other makers for the best
position in the queue at each price level in the limit order book.
An order that is earlier in the queue at a price level is much more
likely to get filled than one positioned later in the queue [25, 65].
Similarly, takers compete with other takers for favorably-priced
bids and offers of scarce resources [25]. The first taker order to
the market has access to the full offered volume, while subsequent
ones have a lower chance of getting filled, as the volume decreases.
A maker who is trying to cancel their “stale” bid or offer may
3In finance literature, “market makers” provide liquidity to the market (i.e., post resting
orders that populate the limit order book), while “takers” remove liquidity by placing
orders that are ‘marketable’ (so immediately match with makers’ orders causing those
maker orders to be removed from the book). These roles are not fixed and participants
transition from maker to taker depending on the side of the trade they take.
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also compete with taker(s) who are trying to lift that bid or offer.
This practice is called “sniping” and involves fast takers buying
assets from or selling assets to slower makers at ‘stale’ bid and offer
prices [13, 25, 41].
2.3 Equal Treatment in Practice
In economic theory, fair races for a resource in contention are won
by the “fastest” participant if the order book operates in a continu-
ous FCFS manner [13, 33]. However, this assumes that the market’s
implementation meets its specification precisely. In practice, this
type of fairness is hard to meet (or even define) as it is a tricky and
multifaceted concept that always involves a degree of subjectiv-
ity [3, 6]. We now discuss some of the reasons strict-FCFS is hard
to realize in practice and why the fastest participant doesn’t always
win.
Jitter. Electronic exchanges comprise a plurality of hardware and
software components that exhibit small non-constant variations
in their processing times. For example, modern computers are op-
timized for maximum performance (instruction throughput) and
thus do not guarantee deterministic execution times. This is due to
speculative execution, cache eviction in the presence of competing
processes, charge-to-read and data prefetching that contribute to
variances4 in the process execution runtimes [29]. Depending on
the component those differences in processing times can vary from
a tenths of nanoseconds to a few hundred microseconds [29, 63].
If the jitter exhibited by an exchange affects each participant to
the same degree, then it may not have an appreciable effect on the
exchange’s fairness.
Uneven Delays. If we use the term ‘jitter’ to describe delays that
affect all participants to the same degree, then the other asymme-
tries in the design and the operation of the exchange introduce
additional delays that affect different participants differently or
unevenly. Major modern exchanges have a distributed architecture
which allows for better performance (e.g., parallelization, load bal-
ancing) and higher availability (e.g., order gateway redundancy).
However, this also results in discrepancies in the order processing
times and asymmetries in the data dissemination speed, due to the
differences in performance among its duplicated components. For
example, an order gateway used by certain participants may be
significantly less crowded than others (intentionally [75] or un-
intentionally) or the cables of colocated participants may differ
in length thus affecting their latency (+/-4 meters or ∼ 20ns per
reference [23]). To address this problem, market operators are mak-
ing an effort to equalize the component delays throughout their
infrastructure. While this has reduced the magnitude of the delay
discrepancies, inter-component differences in delays cannot be fully
eliminated even if the exchange uses and fine-tunes the exact same
hardware and software in all of its replicated components.
Technical Market Manipulation. This type of manipulation re-
lies on technical means to exploit and extenuate what might os-
tensibly seem only to be negligible uneven delays, as well as cause
4Other causes of varying latency were identified in [49] and include thread scheduling
policies, NUMA effects, hyperthreading, power saving features, interrupts and page
faults.
new ones. Unlike economic manipulation which often involves “af-
firmatively misleading” other participants on matters of supply and
demand [47], and is illegal (e.g., spoofing [45]), technical manipula-
tion exploits the implementation details of the exchange itself (e.g.,
slower vs. faster gateways) and its legal standing varies [44].
For example, a patent application from a major US-based futures
exchange describes an exploit by which participants use IP packet
fragmentation to gain an advantage over other traders immediately
prior to economic events [37, 43]. Given an economic event with
two possible outcomes (i.e., a favorable and an unfavorable), these
participants split their orders in several network packets/fragments
and submitted all but one to the exchange. If the outcome of the
event was favorable, they submitted also the remaining fragment,
otherwise they intentionally corrupted the remaining one (e.g., by
invalidating the network/application-layer checksum). In another
instance, the same exchange found participants sending messages
in “triplicate” (sending one copy to each of the three gateways
each participant was allowed to connect to), so as to improve their
chances of outracing their competition by essentially betting one
of their gateways was less loaded than the other two [17].
Participants have also been found to actively influence the op-
eration of the exchange’s subsystems to create new manipulation
opportunities for themselves. The National Stock Exchange of India
has been affected by malicious traders who colluded with exchange
insiders to gain unfair advantages over other participants. Their
modus operandi included: (1) getting information about and access
to less congested gateways, (2) insider knowledge about the exact
opening times of servers as market updates were broadcasted in the
same order participants logged in, (3) delay competing participants
by actively congesting other servers [75].
Overall, regardless of the legal implications of technical market
manipulation5, such practices—seemingly disadvantageously, and
in a manner reminiscent of the ‘arms race’ in pursuit of speed [13,
33]—always result in unequal treatment of equally fast participants
and thus impact the trustworthiness of the market.
2.4 Timescales
Market participants always seek to reduce their reaction and sub-
mission time so as to outrace others competing for the same re-
sources. One of the most common ways of reducing latency is for
trading firms to house their systems in the same datacenter with
the exchange’s matching engine (i.e., colocation). This practice may
result in a “100-200 millisecond" advantage over non-colocated
participants, and particularly those that are geographically quite
distant from the exchange [5].6 Nonetheless, the competition be-
tween colocated participants remains fierce, as exemplified by the
National Stock Exchange of India preferential access colocation
scandal [75].
5 Hardware, software and networking optimizations (e.g., TCP/IP tuning for latency
over bandwidth) are not necessarily manipulative.
6 One response to neutralizing latency differences among geographical dispersed par-
ticipants involves timestamping the sending times of their messages, and accumulating
those messages after their receipt so as to process them by sending time, and not by
receipt time [9, 24, 27, 28]. We are only aware of one such exchange that historically
may have done this [81, p.18].
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Market participants have now the expertise and the technical
capabilities to leverage speed advantages that last only a fraction of
a microsecond or even a few hundred nanoseconds [38, 39, 73, 83].
For example, a public disciplinary notice from a major US-based
future exchange reports that one participant sought to gain a speed
advantage by dropping a single character (i.e., 2 bytes) from their
order submission messages despite the fact their in-house network
link had a bandwidth of 10Gb/s [18]. Interestingly, “speed advan-
tages” are now in the same timescale as the jitter exhibited by
processing and networking systems. Thus, sophisticated market
participants can exploit (ostensibly) minuscule latency discrepan-
cies between different components to gain an advantage over their
competitors.
Due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the exchanges’ ar-
chitectures and infrastructure it is hard to precisely determine
a generic upper bound for the maximum delay discrepancy be-
tween the fastest and the slowest participant (across all exchanges).
For instance, the Metamako switch indicates a jitter of only a few
nanoseconds [63], while the variability in the cache/memory fetch
time can result in inter-participant latency discrepancies of sev-
eral hundred nanoseconds [29]. Similarly, congested routers may
introduce discrepancies ranging from a few tenths to several hun-
dred microseconds. In the rest of this paper, we, conservatively
and without loss of generality, assume that the delay discrepancies
experienced between colocated participants of an exchange do not
exceed 1 millisecond. This is in accordance with that reported by
a major European exchange that estimates discrepancies to be as
high as hundreds of microseconds [23, p.16].
3 TEMPORAL FAIRNESS
Fairness in financial markets and its relation to “speed” has been
a topic of much recent interest from academics [13, 14, 19, 33, 82],
practitioners [58–61] and even the general public [48]. While most
recent works focus on its relation to speed and social welfare, we
study it in the context of fairness. This section defines, in its most
general form, the manifestation of fairness in which we are inter-
ested and examines the reasons modern exchanges often fail to
meet it.
Two market participants P1 and P2 are said to compete for a
trading opportunity op on an exchange E if responsive to the same
economic stimulus and they both submit order messages that seek
to capture op. A market participant’s (P’s) speed is defined to be
the time that elapses between the receipt of the stimulus and the
submission of the order by P7. In the rest of this paper, we adopt the
position of [13, 33] and assume that a market participant’s speed
is a function of their (direct or indirect) investment in technology
i.e., the more a participant spends the faster they are expected to
be. We now provide a formal definition of fairness with respect to
time.
Definition 3.1. Temporal Fairness: A financial exchange E is con-
sidered temporally fair if among all pairs of participants on it the
probability that a slower participant succeeds in capturing a trading
opportunity at the expense of a faster participant (who, responsive
7The discussion on the precise conditions that must be met for the stimulus to have
been considered “received” and for the order messages to have been considered “sent”
is left for future work.
Figure 2: Two market participants P1 and P2 compete for a
trading opportunity by sending order messages to an elec-
tronic financial exchange E after processing an event update
sent by E.Ui , Li andOi denote the update, reaction and trans-
mission latency respectively.
to the same stimulus, is also competing for the same opportunity)
does not exceed 0.5.
While we cannot prove, per se, that this general definition of
temporal fairness is “correct”—rather we must ultimately accept it
as axiomatic—we at least seek to show it is not inconsistent with
specific notions of fairness and speed that have appeared in the
literature. Note also that, besides ensuring that slower participants
cannot be (statistically) advantaged over faster ones, this definition
allows for market designs/order-matching policies that seek to
bring slower and faster participants onto “equal footing”.
3.1 Points of Unfairness
While “temporal fairness” may seem obvious and trivial to achieve,
there are many examples in the literature and mainstream media
where venues have been fined for allowing slower participants
to consistently “overtake” faster ones. For example, the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was fined for publishing market data earlier
to a set of participants [67], while the National Stock Exchange
(NSE) of India was found to provide “preferential access” to certain
customers [75]. Further incidents of real-life unfairness in electronic
exchanges are enumerated in [60]. We now take a more in-depth
look into the different types of delays that may result in fairness
violations.
Given an exchange E and two market participants P1 and P2, we
detail the precise conditions under which the slower (in reaction
time) participant (P1) may be advantaged over P2 that reacts more
quickly to stimuli. Figure 3 illustrates the exchange E pushing an
event update to both participants. The total update latency expe-
rienced by the individual participants is the sum of the individual
delays introduced during this process. The first cause of delay is
the time δ that the exchange takes to prepare the update to be sent
to traders. This work focuses on intra-venue trading and hence δ
does not impact the fairness of the exchange, as it affects all the par-
ticipants equally. However, in scenarios where participants trade in
several exchanges (i.e., inter-venue trading), a slow participant trad-
ing in E1 with a low δ , may be advantaged over a faster participant
trading in E2 with a higher δ (see e.g., [10, 62]).
Unlike δ who affects all the participants equally, ϵ is the time that
elapses from when E sends an update to P1 until the same update is
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Figure 3: An exchange E sends updates to twomarket partic-
ipants P1 and P2. δ denotes the time it elapses from an event
occurring before the exchange sends out the first update to
P1, while ϵ is the time it elapsed until the update to P2 was
sent, after it was sent to P1.
sent to P2. Such delay discrepancies result in substantial differences
in the update latency experienced by the participants. For example,
large ϵ discrepancies are observed in systems who unicast their
updates to each participant sequentially (see also Section 5) [35,
55, 75]. Besides these, updates may be further delayed by other
factors that stand between the exchange and the participants. For
example, margin-of-error differences in ostensibly equal length
network links and network switch congestion are two common
causes of such delays. The total delay discrepancy introduced by
these factors is given byU2 −U1.
Upon receiving an update participants react to the stimulus by
sending their orders to the exchange. We assume that P1 and P2
receive the event update simultaneously. However, P1 has a slower
reaction time than P2 and thus submits its order with a delay ζ
after P2. Normally, this would mean that P2’s order would appear in
the limit order book earlier than P1’s. In practice, there are several
factors that could delay P2’s order, thus allowing P1 to unfairly
overtake it before reaching the exchange’s order gatewaysGw1 and
Gw2. These are usually factors that the exchange is not in control of
e.g., different network cable lengths, busy network links, network
serialization, etc.
For simplicity, we assume that the two orders arrive simultane-
ously at their respective gateways. Gateways and order handling
systems within the exchange are another source of uneven delays
(θ ), as even if their capacity and specifications are identical, several
other factors could impact their performance (see also Section 2.3).
For example, a third market participant may be using one of the
gateways to submit orders at an effective rate of millions per sec-
ond8 thus congesting it severely.
From the above we conclude that there are several points in both
the market data dissemination procedure and the order submission
one that can introduce delays affecting participants unevenly. In
8 It is unlikely a participant could literally submit millions of messages per second
because of throttling that most exchanges implement as a risk mitigation measure at
their gateways. It is not necessary however to congest the gateway for a full second;
even congestion causing momentary delays of nano- or micro-seconds from a burst of
messages with that effective rate can be enough to disadvantage other participants in a
FCFS market.
Figure 4: Two market participants P1 and P2 submit their or-
ders to an exchange E through the exchange’s order gate-
ways Gw1 and Gw2. L1 and L2 denote the response time of
each participant to the common stimulus, while ζ is the ex-
tra time it takes for P2’s order to reach the exchange (from
the time it was sent) compared to P1’s order. θ denotes the
latency difference between the gateways Gw2 and Gw1.
the following section, we explain why those points of unfairness
cannot be always mitigated.
3.2 Practical Considerations
While initially the above latency problems may seem easy to ad-
dress, in practice there are several technical constraints that make
it very hard for exchange operators to completely dissipate “un-
evenness”. For this reason, we argue that the matching processes
of an exchange must be designed in such a manner that fairness
is preserved even if its implementation unavoidably introduces
uneven delays. Put another way, and has been observed by Roth,
we “need to deal with all of a market’s complications, not just its
principal features" [72].
Data Distribution Latency. As seen in Figure 3, exchanges con-
tinuously send update messages to their participants providing
information on the contemporaneous state of their limit order book.
Ideally, these updates would arrive to all the participants simultane-
ously. However, in practice the arrival times of those messages can
differ by up to 1 millisecond (see also Section 2.4). In Section 3.1,
we identified the two types of delays that can affect the update
latency experienced by intra-venue participants: ϵ andU2 −U1. ϵ
is the time that elapses from when an update is sent to P1 until the
same update is sent to P2. While this can occur for several reasons
(e.g., non-optimal exchange processes), we are mostly interested
in causes that persist even in exchanges who have optimized their
processes to prevent uneven delays. For example, discrepancies in
the arrival times of updates may occur solely due to the protocols
realized by the routers of the exchange. If the exchange is using
unicast transmission to send its updates, then by definition the
TCP/UDP packets will be sent sequentially and not simultaneously.
Instead the exchange must use one-shot multicast to ensure that
all the updates are sent at the same time9. However, even in this
9Multicast based on fanout-spitting or application-layer multicast overlay services
suffer from delay problems similar to those of unicast [69].
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case the inter-arrival delay of the packets is reduced but not elimi-
nated [42].U2 −U1 is due to margin-of-errors differences in cable
lengths, congested network routers or severed network links and
can result in certain participants being systematically disadvan-
taged over other slower-to-react participants.
Order Submission Latency. Latency discrepancies in order sub-
missions occur due to ζ and θ delays. ζ is similar toU2 −U1 and is
attributed to network links, routers and other network conditions.
θ is due to inefficiencies and complexities in the exchange’s infras-
tructure. For example, θ can be the result of a slower or congested
order gateway. Such discrepancies are common in systems that
have a non-monolithic architecture that (via horizontal scaling) dis-
tributes the load between several replicated components. In most
non-trading use cases, discrepancies in the order of milliseconds
do not have any impact on the usability or the operation of the
system. However, as discussed in Section 2.4 trading is one of the
few applications that can be severely affected even by seemingly
negligible differences.
4 MODEL & ASSUMPTIONS
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, dissipating uneven delays in an
exchange is a best-effort process that minimizes but does not fully
eliminate discrepancies. The causes of uneven delays often fall
outside of the operator’s control and many of them are due to
technological factors that are very hard to account for and balance in
high-load, distributed systems. However, an exchange can measure
with reasonable accuracy the error-margins of its systems and
subsequently estimate the maximum latency discrepancy that an
unlucky participant may be exposed to (see also Section 2.4). Based
on this knowledge, it can then seek to “equalize” all the orders
that arrive within specific time-margins [57, 58]. Note that this is
compatible with our definition of fairness (Section 3) which allows
for slower participants to be brought on “equal footing” with faster
ones. We now outline how such a policy fits into the general order
processing pipeline, the threat model it should be secure under and
the properties it should preserve.
4.1 System Model
Order “equalization” is enforced through a reordering policy that as-
signs equal priority to all the orders that arrive within a certain time
span. Such policies are realised by a component that “intercepts”
all incoming orders before they reach the matching engine (Fig-
ure 5). For each intercepted order message, the component executes
a reordering algorithm which determines its priority in relation
to the orders that precede it and those that it precedes. Once the
new ordering of the messages has been established, the component
forwards them to the matching engine and the limit order book.
While each race for a resource can have only one winner, reordering
policies aim to stochastically equalize the winning probabilities of
two “comparably” fast participants over many races.
4.2 Threat Model
We assume thatmarket participants are rational players that will use
all the means at their disposal to gain a competitive edge. However,
they will not engage in clearly illegal activities such as spoofing.
Figure 5: Reordering policies are realized by components
that “intercept” all order messages before they reach the
matching engine. Depending on the magnitude of their
inter-arrival time, competing orders are assigned equal or
different execution priorities.
Participants are also assumed to (1) have full knowledge of the
exchange’s design, infrastructure and processes, and (2) be able to
exploit advantages that last only a fraction of a microsecond. They
are also aware of the transmission latency of their own orders and
can modify the structure of their packets, send redundant copies
or even withhold parts of them. In case the exchange uses a non-
FCFS matching policy, participants are also assumed to have full
knowledge of any “equalization” policies and the system’s settings
(e.g., the duration and starting times of the batches).
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, the exchange’s components
introduce both jitter and other uneven delays to the latency expe-
rienced by market participants (e.g., +/-4 meter variations in the
cable lengths of colocated participants [23, p.6]). Participants may
also collude with exchange insiders who can provide them with all
these information on uneven delays exhibited by the exchange’s
components. However, exchange insiders cannot modify the op-
eration of the market (e.g., edit the source code of the matching
algorithm). Exchanges are assumed to have full knowledge of their
customers’ identities (i.e., Know-Your-Customer) and the means to
identify Sybil accounts [21].
4.3 Properties
An order-matching policy needs to have certain properties so that
it 1) guarantees temporal fairness under our threat model, and 2) is
practically applicable.
Correctness.As discussed in Section 3, an electronic trading venue
is temporally fair if slower participants are never advantaged over
a faster ones. Order-matching policies must always handle orders
in a fair manner, at all possible valid states of the limit order book
and for all combinations of order types.
Robustness.Besides correctness, the order-matching policy should
be resilient to both system errors and gaming attempts. Thus, it
must be able to withstand networking issues e.g., severed links,
congested routers and unresponsive servers. Moreover, it should
maintain its fairness properties even at the presence of adversarial,
strategic participants (e.g., technical manipulation attacks).
Minimum Impact.While in theory order matching policies can be
arbitrarily complex, drastic changes in the market structure impact
the trading activity negatively. For example, exchange operators
compete fiercely for their market share and are often wary of long
delays that may cause participants to move to other exchanges with
shorter delays. Thus, designers must strive for minimal divergences
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from the established market structure, as every change carries a risk
of invalidating the existing trading strategies which in turn results
in losses of volume and brokerage (e.g., by disenfranchising market
makers, or by ‘breaking’ existing profitable trading strategies) [59,
68]. Moreover, policies should be as simple as possible, so that
implementation errors are less probable, debugging is easier and the
exposed attack surface is minimized (i.e., economy of mechanism).
For example, short (and constant) delays are preferable as they do
not conceal network issues and are less likely to drive participants
to route their order-messages to competing venues with faster order
execution times [20], and are less likely to conflate ‘weak’ early
trading signals with ‘strong’ later ones [8].
5 EXISTING REORDERING POLICIES
Wenow study various proposals and examine their properties under
our threat model. In all our comparisons, we assume two partic-
ipants P1 and P2 that have equal reaction times. However, P2’s
updates and submitted orders are affected by uneven delays which
give an unfair advantage (dτ ) to P1. Based on the timings reported
in Section 2.4, we assume that the uneven delays experienced by
P1 and P2 do not exceed 1 millisecond. This is without loss of gen-
erality and our analysis also applies to exchanges with longer or
shorter latency error margins or exchanges who want to be fair for
fast but non-colocated participants too.
5.1 First Come, First Served (FCFS)
Most electronic financial exchanges implement a market design
that is known as the Continuous Limit Order Book (CLOB) [13, 32].
This design specifies that order messages are processed by the ex-
change in the temporal order that they are received. In theory, FCFS
guarantees that the fastest participant competing for a trading op-
portunity will always succeed in capturing it. This implies that the
probability of a slower participant capturing a trading opportunity
when in competition with a faster participant will be less than 0.5
(it will be 0 with high probability), which satisfies the correctness
property as it is defined in Section 4.3.
However, in practice, FCFS-based systems suffer from robustness
issues in the presence of uneven delays. As seen in Figure 6, P1
will always outrace P2 despite the fact that they both submit their
orders at time t = 0. Thus, FCFS does not fulfill our robustness
requirement.
5.2 Constant Delays
This policy specifies that an incoming order received by the ex-
change’s engine is delayed by a fixed amount of time before it is
included in the order book. This mechanism is used (or has been
proposed) by certain exchanges [7, 12, 48, 54, 74] and can prevent
certain types of unfairness if applied asymmetrically between the
participants. More specifically, if the delays are applied only on
takers’ orders, then it protects makers from sniping attacks [13, 41]
that exploit uneven delays. Unfortunately, this mechanism is only
effective when applied asymmetrically and thus cannot guarantee
fairness for all market participants. For example, it cannot prevent
unfairness that manifests in maker vs. maker races, and in taker vs.
taker races.
Figure 6: FCFS guarantees that an exchange remains “fair”
in non-adversarial, perfect conditions. However, if a market
participant P2 experiences uneven delays in their updates
and/or order submission times (e.g., due to a congested order
gateway), FCFS fails to preserve fairness and allows other
participants (P1) to exploit that delay to outrace them.
Figure 7: Random delays aim to de-emphasize small time
differences in the response times of market participants (P1
and P2). Each incoming order is delayed by a randomly sam-
ples period of time before it
5.3 Random Delays
Harris [33] made one of the first proposals that sought to de-
emphasize the importance of speed. Random delays aim to make it
equally likely for participants with similar response times to have
success in both price-making and price-taking. This design has been
implemented by at least one real-world financial exchange [53] and
imposes random delays on order messages after they are initially
received by the exchange. Thus, orders can be matched only after
they have been subject to the random (uniformly distributed) delay.
This policy is simple to specify and implement, and can improve the
fairness properties of an exchange, as it guarantees that the advan-
taged participant (P1) won’t always be the one that wins. However,
it fails to substantially reduce the advantage of P1 unless very “long
delays" (relative to differences in speed it seeks to equalize) are
used [60].
In the example of Figure 7, the two participants P1 and P2 have a
difference in the delays they are exposed to dτ = 1ms . If we apply a
random delay of 2ms , then the orders of P1 and P2 will be processed
within the time intervals [2,4] and [3,5] respectively. If the sampled
delay applied on P1’s order is less than dτ = 1ms , then P1 always
wins the race (Region R1). Similarly, if P2’s order is delayed for
more than 2ms − dτ = 1ms , then P1 is guaranteed to win (Region
R3). However, P2 will win in 50% of the races where both orders are
executed in Region R2. The two delays are sampled independently
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from Uni f [0, 2] and thus we can easily estimate how likely that to
happen:
Pr (P1 ∈ R2 ∧ P2 ∈ R2) =
Pr (P1 ∈ R2)Pr (P2 ∈ R2) =
1/2 ∗ 1/2 =
0.25
We observe that even if we apply a delay that has twice the
duration of the uneven delays present in the exchange, we fail
to eliminate unfair advantages and P1 still wins 75% of the time.
This limits the applicability of random delays as there is a direct
trade-off between the fairness achieved and the divergence from
the “normal” operation of the exchange. While this may not seem
particular worrisome in this case, increases in latency exacerbate
adverse selection of “stale quotes" and create sniping opportunities
even against fast participants. Random delays are also prone to
gaming as participants may send multiple redundant copies of the
same order to increase their chances of getting a very low latency10
(i.e., multiple lottery tickets).
5.4 Frequent Batch Auctions
An alternative design that has received much attention from the
academic community—and indeed seeks to mitigate the technol-
ogy ‘arms race’ among market participants in pursuit of speed—is
known as both the frequent call market [82] or frequent batch auc-
tion (FBA) [13]. FBA divides the trading day into fixed-length (L)
batching intervals, and after it accumulates all the orders that ar-
rived within each interval for joint processing, it matches all the
received “buys” and “sells” at a single clearing price time.
If we assume that the economic events that trigger races between
participants are uniformly distributed with respect to time, then
the probability a participant P1 and a participant P2 (who is by dτ
units of time disadvantaged compared to P1)11 end up in the same
batch is:
L − dτ
L
for dτ ≤ L. If both P1 and P2 end up in the same batch then the
probability that P2 succeeds at capturing the trading opportunity
is 0.5, which implies that the total likelihood that P2 captures the
trading opportunity is 12 · L−dτL . Thus, a batch interval L = 2ms
would result in Pr (P2 wins) = 1/2∗(2−1)/2 = 0.25. By increasing L
to 3ms , we further increase P2’s winning probabilities to∼33%. Thus,
FBA still requires long delays to address small differentials in speed,
while the improvement in fairness diminishes rather fast as the
length of the batching intervals increases. FBA is not prone to the
same attacks that affect random-delays but participants may still be
incentivized to compete on speed to “bang the close” by submitting
their orders just before the end of a batching period [25, 59, 64],
and may be further incentivized to submit quantity in excess of
their actual demand to increase the probability of receiving their
desired allocation of a resource [25].
10Note that this does not have to do with the participants trying to minimize their
order submission delay by trying different routes and gateways (which is already
accounted for in the 1ms advantage of P1).
11 Note that by definition dτ > 0.
6 LIBRA
We now introduce Libra, a reordering policy that alleviates the
effect of uneven delays introduced by the market’s infrastructure,
while remaining “temporally fair” at all times.
6.1 Rationale
Our premise is that there will always be participants who are advan-
taged in receiving updates and/or in submitting new orders, as no
distributed system can remain symmetrical and perfectly load bal-
anced at all times. Instead, we seek to achieve temporal fairness by
stochastically equalizing participants whose order submission times
are within the error-margins measured by the exchange operator.
6.2 Reordering Processes
Libra operates in two phases realised by Algorithms 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Once a new order-message o (structure details are available
in Table 1) arrives at the exchange, the policy component intercepts
it and executes Algorithm 1: If the message is a Cancel order, it is
then forwarded immediately to the matching engine without any
delay added. Otherwise, the message is placed in a buffer (b). The
buffer is determined based on the instrument the order seeks to
capture, its side (buy or sell), its price and if it is “marketable” or not
(i.e., crosses the spread or not). A buy order at a price higher than
at least one of the resting sell orders is placed in the “marketable”
bufferM[instrument][buy] with a Null price. Similarly a sell order
at a price lower than at least one of the resting buy orders is placed
in the “marketable” buffer M[instrument][sell] with a Null price.
Every other order, retains its price and is placed in a buffer specific
to its price level i.e., B[instrument][side][price]. The only excep-
tion are Immediate-or-Cancel (IOC) orders that are dropped if they
are not filled immediately. Upon adding an order to a previously
empty buffer, a “drain” timer starts counting up to a predetermined
amount of time.
Algorithm 2 is executed onb once its predetermined timer elapses.
Initially, it groupsb’s messages into lists per participant (P[ ]), based
on the identifier ou found in each order. Subsequently, each partici-
pant’s list is sorted and the orders are ranked based on their arrival
time. Orders who arrived earlier are placed closer to the top of the
list. Additionally, the algorithm generates a random ordering of the
participant identifiers (R). In its last stage, the algorithm iterates
over the participants’ lists (according to their random order in R).
On each iteration, the algorithm selects one of the lists, pops its
top order and forwards it to the matching engine of the exchange.
The algorithm keeps iterating over the participants’ lists until all
of them are empty.12
6.3 System Properties
In this Section, we examine if Libra fulfills the fairness, robustness
and minimum impact requirements we seek for modern markets.
Correctness. Under ideal, non-faulty conditions, our specification
substantially ensures that Libra will handle orders fairly at all times
and ensures that slow participants will never be advantaged over
faster ones. However, participants with small differences in their
response times may be “equalized” by our order-batching algorithm.
12Alternative draining policies, i.e., approaches to ‘Algorithm 2’ for Libra are disclosed
in [56].
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Symbol Name Description
ou Identifier Unique Market Participant Identifier
oi Instrument Unique Identifier of asset traded
ot Type Order types (e.g., Market, Limit, Cancel, IOC)
os Side Buy or Sell Order
op Price Limit order price
Table 1: Each order o has five fields that are considered by
Libra’s reordering policy.
Algorithm 1: Buffering. Collects each incoming order mes-
sage o and either forwards it to the matching engine directly or
places it in its corresponding buffer. If the order is immediately
marketable (i.e., crosses the spread) it is placed in the buy/sell
bufferM , otherwise it is moved to a price-specific buffer from
the set of buffers B.
Input :Order message o
1 instrument← oi ▷ Instrument traded
2 side← os ▷ Buy or Sell?
3 type← ot ▷ Market, Limit, IOC
4 if ot = Cancel then
5 Forward(o)
6 Return()
7 else if side = Buy and price ≥ Best_offer then
8 b∗ ← M[instrument][buy][Null] ▷ Reference to marketable “buy” buffer
9 else if side = Sell and price ≤ Best_bid then
10 b∗ ← M[instrument][sell][Null] ▷ Reference to marketable “sell” buffer
11 else if type , IOC then
12 price← op ▷ Limit price
13 b∗ ← B[instrument][side][price] ▷ Reference to price-specific buffer
14 else
15 Return()
16
17 if b∗ , ∅ then
18 b∗ .append(o)
19 else
20 b∗ ← {o }
21 Start_Timer(b∗) ▷ The 1st order starts the timer
Algorithm 2: Draining. The draining algorithm is executed
whenever a timer (of a buffer b) goes off. It initially reorders
the messages held by the buffer and then forwards them to the
matching engine.
Input :Buffer of order messages b , List of participant identifiersU
1 P ← {}
2 for o ∈ b do
3 P [ou ] ← P [ou ] ∪ o ▷ List of orders per participant
4 for u ∈ U do
5 P [ou ] ← sort(P [ou ]) ▷ Sort by ascending arrival time
6 R ← shuffle(U) ▷ Random order of participant IDs
7 while not (P [u] = ∅ ∀u ∈ U ) do
8 for u ∈ R do
9 if P [u] , ∅ then
10 Forward(P [u].pop()) ▷ Pop the oldest order of u
As explained in Section 3, this does not violate our definition and
it is even considered a desirable feature by some works (e.g., see
“social welfare” considerations [13, 14, 25, 33] in Section 8).
Robustness.Wenow look into various (failure and adversarial) sce-
narios, examine the resilience of our policy and motive the relevant
design decisions. Our analysis here cannot exhaustively present all
possible attacks and failure scenarios. Instead, we consider those
that affect other reordering policies, as well as new ones that seek
to exploit the specific characteristics of Libra.
One of the attacks seeking to exploit the processes of Libra is
“placeholding”. A fast participant (P1) submits a “placeholder” order
just before an economic event occurs so as to 1) intentionally trigger
the buffer’s timer early and 2) place their actual order shortly before
the end of the delay period. This attacks aims to effectively exclude
disadvantaged participants (P2) whose reaction/transmission time
is too long for them to submit an order before the batch closes. For
example, given an instrument trading at $1.00 and a timer length
of 3ms, first P1 bids at $0.01, 2.9 milliseconds ahead of an economic
news release. This starts the batch timer for the instrument and
enables P1 to place its true bid or offer at 3.0ms (depending on the
event’s outcome) while leaving P2 who is slower, off the batch. To
avoid this attack, Libra holds a separate race for each price level.
In this case, P1 will trigger the timer for a race at a price-level that
P2 will never compete in. Such attacks are also the reason that IOC
orders are not included in buffers and do not trigger any timers. If
they were, participants could exploit them to start the timer early
at no economic cost for them [59].
P1 can also submit a placeholding order at the correct price-level
but of the minimum quantity possible (usually 10 or 100 shares in
stock exchanges). To disincentivize such practices, we use arrival-
time sorting (lines 4-5 in Algorithm 2). In the presence of another
comparably fast participant (P3), who is not manipulative, P1’s
actual order (submitted after the event) will always execute after
the first order of P3, as the early “placeholding” order of minimum
size will always be on top of P1’s list (sorted by arrival time).
Moreover, unlike random-delays and FBA, Libra is tolerant to
manipulative participants who submit several duplicated order
copies (see attack in Section 5.3). This resilience is due to the par-
ticipant grouping operation (Algorithm 2) and the random iteration
sequence that prevents participants from skewing their execution
probabilities by adding more orders. This mechanism can be gamed
through proxy/Sybil accounts that operate under seemingly inde-
pendent participant identities but are controlled by one firm only.
In our live deployment of Libra, we use information from Know-
Your-Customer processes to detect and merge parent and child
companies that have common ownership interests.
Minimum Impact. Order-triggered timers allow our policy to
equalize participants without introducing delays that are long in
relation to the magnitude of temporal unfairness. In fact, Libra
achieves fairness even if the batch-length is equal to the magnitude
of the temporal unfairness it seeks to address. Let two competing
participants P1 and P2, whose order submission latency is 2ms and
3ms (due to uneven delays), respectively. A Libra deployment with
delay T ≥ 1ms guarantees that P1 and P2 will have equal chances
of winning in the race. Once P1 submits their order, the timer starts
and P2 will have at least 1ms to submit theirs. As explained above,
the participant shuffling ensures that two orders that are in the
same batch have the same probability of being processed first.
Finally, the Cancel-order reordering exemption (i.e., no delay
added to Cancel orders) is an optional feature that aims to reduce
adverse selection for makers. It allows Cancel orders from slow
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market makers to outrace bids and offers from fast takers and thus
prevents takers from engaging in Sniping and other practices that
take advantage of mispriced bids from slow participants. While it
may seem to be a fairness concern as it allows certain participants
to overtake others, it is common in financial markets that makers
and takers are not subject to the same exact treatment [2, 13]. Libra
can be also deployed without this feature but it has been observed
on a different forex trading venue that treating makers and takers
‘the same’ in a batching regime can actually exacerbate adverse
selection/sniping [31]—a concern also expressed by others [46].
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this Section, we evaluate Libra experimentally by deploying it
in a live forex exchange (Refinitiv Matching [59]) and monitoring
various aspects of the market. Our measurements cover the trading
activity of a foreign exchange over a two-year trading period. The
exchange serves hundreds of trading firms (i.e., participants) and
thousands of users. The combined market share of the exchange
and its competing platform is estimated to be 15% [34]. The scales
on some of the figures’ axes have been redacted, as they contain
commercially sensitive information. All the redacted scales cross
the other axis at 0.
7.1 Impact on Participants
In this first experiment, we measure the impact that Libra’s latency
(i.e., batch length) has on participants on the venue. The results
are shown in Figure 8. Initially, we start from a batch length of
T = 1ms which we gradually increase up to 10ms in intervals of
1ms . For each latency setting, we report the number of takers races
that took place (blue) and the quantity that competing participants
raced for in USD Millions (purple). As the latency increases, Libra
enables slower participants to compete on equal footing with faster
ones. Thus, the longer the period, by definition, the more likely it is
that price taking will involve more than one participants. However,
as we see in Figure 8 lengthening the batching period does not
commensurately increase the amount of taker races (i.e., instances
in which more than one distinct participant is racing to hit the same
bid or offer). In fact, a tenfold increase in the the batching period
(from 1ms to 10ms) resulted in a less than 50% increase in both the
number of races and the quantity raced for. What this seems to
indicate is that there are diminishing returns from what some have
argued involves disadvantageously imposing longer (rather than
shorter) delays in order processing on a venue (see [8, 10]).
In Figure 9, we stratified our dataset based on the number of
taker races each participant (trading firm) competed in weekly.
This illustration aims to show the number of firms that are affected
by the increase in latency imposed by the setting the length of
the batch to increasing values. We plot three main classes: Firms
that competed weekly in >50 races (green-diamond), in >100 races
(purple-rectangle), and in >1000 races (blue-triangle). The first two
classes (>50 and >100 races) likely include participants who com-
pete with others by coincidence, whereas the third one (>1000)
shows participants who compete habitually. We observe that the
tenfold increase in latency (1ms to 10ms) less than doubled the num-
ber of firms competing (class 3), while it had an even smaller effect
(∼25%) on classes 1 and 2. We also observe that most participants
Figure 8: The effect of the batch length on the amount of
“taking” that involves more than one participants. Libra
does not commensurately increase the amount of taking in
contention, even when the latency is increased tenfold.
Figure 9: Increases in latency seem to affect primarily partic-
ipantswho compete inmore than 1000 races perweek, while
participants who occasionally compete by coincidence seem
less affected.
do not compete with others frequently and only a small segment
of the market seem to be using such strategies. These differences
in latency are relevant only to fast and sophisticated traders, as
investors who are not automated and in physical proximity cannot
deploy strategies at these timescales. This again may suggest that
shorter delays imposed for the purposes of batching are preferable
to longer ones.
7.2 Competing vs. Non-Competing Participants
To better understand the degree that Libra affects participants that
directly compete with others, we measured the total number of
instances where participants tried to take a price from the market
(blue) and the percentage of races where two or more participants
were competing (orange). Figure 10 shows the monthly trend of
these two variables since the deployment of Libra. We observe that
while the total amount of taking fluctuates with the trading volumes
per month, the level of price taking that is in contention remains at
approximately 10% throughout the whole period measured. What
this seems to indicate is that the deployment of Libra did not cause
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Figure 10: Despite the fluctuations in the total amount of
price taking, the proportion of price taking that is in con-
tention remained stable (∼10%) since the deployment of Li-
bra.
Figure 11: Adverse selection graph that illustrates the effec-
tiveness of Libra’s cancel-order prioritization feature in pre-
venting sniping.
a significant change in the amount of price-taking activity that is
in contention.
7.3 Sniping Protection
As discussed in the previous section, Cancel-order prioritization is
an optional feature of Libra that aims to prevent adverse selection
against market makers. Figure 11 shows the number of cancel
orders that overtook other orders from takers (blue). Additionally,
it illustrates the percentage of matches that were prevented due to
a cancel order overtaking a taker’s “sniping” order (grey). While the
number of “overtakes” fluctuates a lot over time, the percentage of
matches avoided due to the prioritization of cancels steadily grows
from 0.5% to over 1%. This highlights that the (optional) exemption
feature not only prevented a common side-effect of reordering
policies (i.e., increased sniping [46]) but also positively contributed
in mitigating the phenomenon in general.
8 RELATEDWORK
Our discussion of order-matching policies in this work has centered
on our strict definition of temporal fairness and the requirements
that market designs need to fulfill in order to be practically applica-
ble.
Social welfare
Besides these topics, the market design literature [13, 14, 25, 33]
has also explored the notion of social welfare pertaining to market
participant’s speeds. The argument that appears throughout that
literature is (roughly) that the technology ‘arms race’ in pursuit of
speed is socially wasteful, a form of the prisoner’s dilemma, and all
market participants would benefit if all electronic financial markets
were re-designed to de-emphasize the effects of participant speed
on resource allocation. As compelling as this social value argument
for “slowing” markets down might be, it is far from settled as to
whether doing so actually improves them. In particular, several
works have argued that such interventions have the opposite effect
than the intended [4, 10, 11, 16, 22, 26, 78] [61, fn.8]. For example,
pertaining to the regulatory approval of the Intercontinental Ex-
change’s speedbump (i.e., 3ms constant delay) [7], the objecting
commissioners argued that: “Risk (and reward) move at the speed
of information. Those that invent, and invest in, faster information
transmission technologies to capitalize on market dislocations reap
the profits of their advantage.” [71]. Overall, the critics of speed de-
emphasization argue that the competition between traders drives
technological advances and enhances the accessibility and respon-
siveness of the markets.
Technical Market Manipulation
Another line of research has recently focused on a particular set of
technical problems, that are also related to “speed” in continuous
electronic markets. These works study unfairness from the per-
spective of systems security and approaches policy gaming strate-
gies as security problems or problems of technical (cf. economic)
market manipulation [1, 54, 77]. In this category of problems, mar-
ket participants exploit technical flaws in the electronic trading
venue’s implementation to gain speed advantages over other par-
ticipants. Examples of such attacks and exploitable vulnerabilities
have appeared in various patent applications [43, 76], disciplinary
notices [18], presentations [17], and a forthcoming book [37].
9 CONCLUSIONS
This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical marketmodels
and their real-life implementations in electronic markets. Towards
this goal, we provided a novel definition of “temporal fairness” and
a set of requirements that enable researchers and practitioners to
realistically evaluate market designs and their robustness to techni-
cal inefficiencies. Based on these, we then analysed several existing
reordering policies and used our observations to design a novel
semi-continuous market that de-emphasizes speed advantages and
retains its fairness properties regardless of infrastructure inefficien-
cies and gaming attempts. Our experimental results seem to support
our initial analysis and show that Libra reduces speed-based preda-
tory trading without severely impacting existing trading strategies.
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